CLOSED LIST SYSTEM
The story starts with the Labour manifesto of 1997, which stated:
'We have long supported a proportional voting system jor election to the European Parliament. ' The brevity7 of this promise, which did not mention a specific voting system, was to play an important part in the confrontation with the House of Lords. Interestingly, the Bill was not included in the Queen's Speech but was brought forward following persuasion by the Liberal Democrats.
Trouble started before the Bill was even published, in October 1997, over a code of conduct gagging Labour MEPs from discussing publicly the new selection procedure for MEPs.
Criticism by the opposition parties as well as rebel Labour MEPs greeted publication of the Bill, which provided for the 'closed list' system of proportional representation. The country is divided into electoral regions (nine in England, and one each for for a registered party or for an independent candidate. However, the seats allocated to a party are filled from the party's list in the order in which they appear on the list. In other words, the voter cannot show a preference for any candidate on the list, but only vote for a party; not an individual, unless they are standing as an independent. This raises the fundamental issue of what elections are for.
Although the basic division of opinion between those who support 'first past the post' in preference to proportional representation formed an undercurrent in the debates, as some of the protagonists openly declared, it was conceded by the opposition that proportional representation was a manifesto commitment and had to be accepted as such, particularly in the House of Lords. The Liberal Democrats, in principle, supported a different system of proportional representation, namely the single transferable vote, but did not think it was appropriate in the circumstances of these elections. The debate was thus narrowly focused on whether the system should be one of open or closed party-lists. In the former the voters can choose the candidate they prefer from the list, while in the latter the order is determined by the party' (a system used by the majority of European voters). The higher a candidate's position on the list, the better are his or her chances of election. Executive Committee and regional representatives of the party.
This puts enormous power into the hands of the party'
leadership over who will be elected and this will strengthen their party loyalty rather than their independence. 
ROLE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
When the Bill was debated for the first time in the House of Lords, in April 1998, there was much opposition across the political spectrum to the closed list system. This was a foretaste of things to come. Strangely, the confrontation between the two houses took another six months to materialise. Although a Conservative amendment proposing the open list system, which was finally successful in the House of Lords, was first put forward in June 1998, it was not put to the vote because it was getting late. At report stage it was moved again but not put to the vote, on the grounds that it would not have received enough but said nothing about the voting system to be adopted. The Lords were not rejecting the Bill at second reading, as happened in the War Crimes Bill, nor were they passing a wrecking amendment because it did not remove proportional representation from the Bill. The Lords, by their amendment passed on 20 October 1998, were asking the Commons to think again. What was unprecedented was that the Bill was batted back and forth between the two houses five times.
It was alleged by one peer that no Bill over the past 30 years had been amended bv the same amendment more than twice. It was, of course, not the same amendment which ping-ponged five times between the houses. The rules of the game were the o subject of a brief exchange between Lord Carter, the Labour Chief Whip and Viscount Cranborne, then the opposition leader in the House of Lords, when the Lords insisted on their amendment after its rejection by the Commons. Lord Carter put it succinctly when he said, 'They [the Commons] cannot insist on it again. They have to produce an amendment in lieu'; otherwise the Bill would be lost. The Commons did pass an amendment in lieu, namely providing for a review of the operation of the system to report to Parliament within six months. This did not satisfy their lordships because the elections would still be held under the closed system and there was no guarantee that a review which was unfavourable to this system would be implemented. The Commons tried again with a second amendment in lieu by adding a new sub-section to the first amendment, spelling out that the review must consider how the open list might affect the result of an election. This was derided as 'not even a crumb from the rich man's table' by the opposition spokesman in the Lords. The Bill was sent back again to the Commons with the hope of a substantial compromise. This was not forthcoming, but a third amendment in lieu provided a new sub-section making the Secretary of State consult 'such persons appearing to him to be interested as he thinks appropriate' before appointing members of the review body. This was done on the penultimate day of the session. A few hours later it was contemptuously dismissed by the opposition spokesman in the Lords as hardlv moving us on a millimetre. The 
Kaleidoscope of interests
The issue was, however, far more complex than a simple confrontation between the elected and the unelected house, the 
USE OF THE PARLIAMENT ACTS
By the time the Bill returned to the Commons in the new session, the year which has to elapse between the first and last occasions it is passed in the House of Commons, had already expired. The government put before the House a guillotine motion which was alleged to be the most severe that had ever One peer abstained because he headed one of the lists as 
CONCLUSION
Is it a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing? Why did the unprecedented game of ping-pong with the Lords yield no results at all? On two previous confrontations earlier in the session the Lords had won notable victories: on tuition fees for English students at Scottish universities the government promised an independent review, which was accepted by the Lords; in the case of lowering the age of consent for homosexuals to 16, the Lords' defeat of the clause, which had been added to the Crime and Disorder Bill on a free vote in the Commons, led to the withdrawal of the clause by the government with a promise of new legislation in the next session (which was again defeated in the Lords). In each case there were special circumstances leading to a deal or climbdown. The two houses when in conflict are engaged in a game of poker with each side trying to bluff the other into climbing down.
With hindsight the unprecedented confrontation over the European Parliamentary Elections Bill cannot be seen in isolation from the battle over House of Lords' reform which was going on behind the scenes. We now know there were divisions in the Conservative Party over how to handle this issue and that the leadership was opposed to a deal and determined to face down the government. The suspicion cannot be avoided that this was a dress rehearsal for the coming battle over Lords reform so far as the Conservative peers were concerned. Having forced the government to use the Parliament Acts, the government was then handed the Bill on a plate, as a result of a deal negotiated with the Conservative peers which cannot be divorced from the proposal to reprieve 91 hereditary members of the House of Lords.
As we have seen, however, opposition to the Bill was not just a party political battle but received support across the political spectrum and from cross-benchers and bishops. There was much heart-searching among these peers about frustrating the will of the elected house, particularly when the confrontation between the houses was reaching its climax,. The Bill to abolish the right of hereditary peers to be members ot the House of Lords was introduced in the House of Commons on 19 January. In a statement to both houses, the government confirmed that it was minded to accept an amendment to the Bill, when it reached the Lords, to temporarily reprieve some hereditary peers until there is a fully reformed second chamber. That depended, however, 'on the extent to which the normal conventions relating to the government's legislative programme are being observed' a euphemism for not blocking the Bill. (This amendment to reprieve 92 hereditary peers has now been passed in the Lords.) The statement accompanied a White Paper setting out the government's proposals for Lords' reform both in the short term (the transitional house) and longer-term reform, which would be considered by a Royal Commission to report by the end of 1999 on the role, function and composition of a second chamber. The terms of reference make it clear that the House of Commons must remain the pre-eminent chamber of Parliament. Ominously, the government, in setting out its o\vn views on the powers of a reformed second chamber, considers that they should be reduced, rather than restricting their exercise by 'institutionalising the understandings' under which the house now operates understandings which were evolved precisely because the house was unreformed. In other words the government does not envisage that a second chamber endowed with greater legitimacy should act as a better check on the Commons. The Commons will still normally be dominated by the government formed from the party with a majority of MPs, unless there is electoral reform more radical than that proposed by the Jenkins Commission. Plus $a change, plus c'est la meme chose. ©
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Misplaced trust?
by Peter Willoughby
The trust concept has been used for more than 800 years as a mechanism to protect and conserve family wealth. However, in recent years, failure to set up trusts correctly and to administer them scrupulously has resulted in litigation. Professor Peter Willoughby outlines the dangers and pitfalls of setting up and administering trusts. 
